The Taif Agreement, in one way or another, marked a new beginning for internal Lebanese coexistence and external relations. Since then, one could say—though this statement is tinged with a degree of illusion—that we have lived for nearly thirty years under a political system and governance framework that are entirely different from what existed before.

From September 30, 1989, to May 25, 2000, the Lebanese were divided into those supporting the resistance movement aimed at liberating occupied land, and those who were either indifferent or too ashamed to express opposition. This division did not affect the first group, particularly under Syrian dominance.

After May 25, 2000, with the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanese territories it had occupied, the voices of the second group grew louder. They were driven by a fundamental question regarding the necessity and relevance of the continued presence of the "resistance," especially in the absence of an occupying force. Some of those who had previously supported the resistance also joined in questioning its purpose. However, the sense of excessive power, bolstered by the withdrawal in 2000 and the propaganda that reinforced the notion of fatherly dominance to the point of infallibility, did not allow for serious consideration of this opinion or even the acknowledgment of the right to dissent.

Moreover, the resistance, which had once presented itself as a "liberation movement" against occupation and in the absence of a functioning state, evolved into an entity that capitalized on its gains and built sustainable private institutions, ultimately becoming a quasi-state that thrived on and consumed the resources of the legitimate state.

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The Taif Agreement, in one way or another, marked a new beginning for internal Lebanese coexistence and external relations. Since then, one could say—though this statement is tinged with a degree of illusion—that we have lived for nearly thirty years under a political system and governance framework that are entirely different from what existed before.

From September 30, 1989, to May 25, 2000, the Lebanese were divided into those supporting the resistance movement aimed at liberating occupied land, and those who were either indifferent or too ashamed to express opposition. This division did not affect the first group, particularly under Syrian dominance.

After May 25, 2000, with the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanese territories it had occupied, the voices of the second group grew louder. They were driven by a fundamental question regarding the necessity and relevance of the continued presence of the "resistance," especially in the absence of an occupying force. Some of those who had previously supported the resistance also joined in questioning its purpose. However, the sense of excessive power, bolstered by the withdrawal in 2000 and the propaganda that reinforced the notion of fatherly dominance to the point of infallibility, did not allow for serious consideration of this opinion or even the acknowledgment of the right to dissent.

Moreover, the resistance, which had once presented itself as a "liberation movement" against occupation and in the absence of a functioning state, evolved into an entity that capitalized on its gains and built sustainable private institutions, ultimately becoming a quasi-state that thrived on and consumed the resources of the legitimate state.

Click on the PDF to read the full article.